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SUPPLEMENTAL BUT NOT EQUAL:
REPLY TO DELL'OLIO ON FEMININE
LANGUAGE FOR GOD
John W. Cooper

This paper addresses central issues in the debate about inclusive language for
God by responding to Andrew Dell'Olio, who offered biblical, theological, linguistic, and ethical reasons for a "supplemental" use of feminine language for
God. Since he leaves unclear whether "supplemental" means "secondary to"
or "fully equal to" the masculine language of the biblical tradition, it is difficult to determine whether he makes his case. While a secondary role for feminine language for God is legitimate, I argue that giving feminine language a
status equal to the Bible's masculine language for God is not warranted by the
standard biblical and theological criteria of the Christian tradition.

Andrew Dell'Olio's "Why Not God the Mother?"! challenges several common arguments against calling God "Mother:" that the Bible does not do
so; that Jesus did not do so; that "Father" has a special linguistic status that
the Bible's feminine imagery does not share; that using Mother language
leads to pantheism. He uses a number of standard arguments to defend
"the supplementary use of feminine language for God, including the term
'Mother-God'" (p. 193): that Scripture itself contains feminine language for
God; that certain religious experiences can warrant "Mother" as a supplement to "Father;" that using only masculine language is tantamount to
idolatry because God is ontologically ungendered; and that failure to use
feminine language for God perpetuates sexism.
But Dell'Olio's article suffers from a significant ambiguity in "the supplementary use of feminine language for God." I will argue that it is permissible for faithful Christians to refer to God supplementally as "Mother"
in certain ways and in certain contexts, but that we are not warranted by
traditional Christian criteria in making "Mother" equal to "Father" in frequency of use, in linguistic status as a primary title, or in its role in religious and liturgical discourse. 2
1. The Meaning of "Supplemental Feminine Language"
Two broad and importantly different positions are currently debated. One
regards feminine language for God as supplementary but secondary. It holds
that "Father" and the rest of the biblical tradition's masculine vocabulary
for God should remain the primary language of the Christian faith, but
that "Mother" and other feminine references may sometimes be used in
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secondary ways to "supplement" it. 1 The other position insists that feminine language is supplementary and equal! "Mother" is just as appropriate
as "Father" as a primary title or name for God in Scripture, the Triune
Name, liturgy and worship, the Creeds, and in all Christian discourse.
Most advocates of inclusive language for God (whom I call "inclusivists")
are aware of the supplemental but secondary position and reject it, insisting on fully egalitarian inclusivism.5 Although Dell'Olio is not clear on
which understanding of "supplementary" he means to defend, the arguments he uses and most of the writers to whom he appeals advocate fully
egalitarian inclusivism, a position that I do not think can be warranted by
the standards of historic Christianity.

II. Revelation and Religious Experience as
Warranting Sources of Language for God
How has ecumenical Christianity (Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and
Protestant) understood revelation and extra-canonical religious experience
as sources and warrants of language for God? This issue arises when
Dell'Olio charges Elizabeth Achtemeier with limiting our language for God
to the (masculine) language of the Bible (p. 194) and faults Donald Hook
and Alvin Kimel for privileging the words of Jesus, who called God
"Father" (pp. 197-99). He points to terms such as "Trinity" and "Perfect
Being" as evidence that Christian tradition has not limited itself to the
words of Jesus or the Bible. He appeals to divine revelation in creation and
to post-biblical religious experience as legitimating sources of Mother language for God (p. 200).
Dell'Olio is surely correct to invoke natural revelation or natural knowledge of God and religious experience as traditional sources of language for
God. But historic Christianity also acknowledges the definitive status of
special or supernatural revelation as proclaimed in apostolic tradition and
recorded in Holy Scripture/ embracing it as the final criterion by which
claims about God's identity and purposes made by theologians, mystics,
philosophers, and other religions are to be interpreted, evaluated, and corrected. The particularities of supernatural revelation are not reduced to the
more general content of creational revelation or natural theology.
Religious experience is not accorded the status of special revelation.
According to the traditional view, therefore, our verbalization of the
motherly qualities of God revealed in nature and apprehended in religious
experience cannot share the foundational status of the language of supernatural revelation. At most Mother language can be supplemental in a secondary way. The God who mothers us and the whole creation is the
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, named by Jesus and witnessed in Scripture
(Matt. 28:19). Questions about Dell'Olio's arguments for Mother language
arise because he does not rank and relate revelation and religious experience the traditional way but seems to regard natural revelation, supernatural revelation, and religious experience as roughly equal sources of language for God.
Dell'Olio affirms Scripture as revelation, but is hesitant to regard its
naming of God as historically definitive. He warns against making
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straightforward final appeals to the Bible regarding language for God
because all interpretation is finite, fallible, self-interested, and liable to be
patriarchal (p. 204) and because the Scriptures "are God's word revealed
through human beings' evolving, and limited, historical consciousness" (p.
205). While these points warrant caution, generations of biblical interpreters have taken account of them but do not share Dell'Olio's reluctance
to view Scripture as the final authority on the names of God.
He also reverses the traditional order between biblical language and
philosophical theology when he appeals to God's ontological genderlessness as the standard by which to correct the masculine language of the biblical tradition, which allegedly promotes a "form of idolatry" (p. 205). In
historic Christianity, awareness of God's transcendence moved the faithful
to embrace Scripture as God's gracious verbal self-disclosure, not to relativize it. Accordingly, the church did not eliminate or augment the masculine language of God as Father even though it soon recognized that God is
not ontologically masculine or male. 7 It used insights from philosophical
theology to help interpret the language of Holy Scripture, to articulate
what it means that the one ungendered God is Father, Son and Holy Spirit,
but not to alter or replace biblical language, as inclusivism insists.
Dell'Olio's view of religious experience in relation to Scripture likewise
seems to be more broad and egalitarian than the traditional view. He
appeals to the experience of early Christian gnostics (p. 200, nAO) and
Mary Baker Eddy (the founder of Christian Science), who are outside of the
orthodox Christian tradition, as possible legitimating "initial baptisms" of
"Mother" as a name for God (p. 200). Against Hook and Kimel, who
would limit such legitimation to the witness of Scripture, he claims "there
need only be some reference-fixing path from the names to God, regardless
of how that reference originally got fixed" (p. 200).
Dell'Olio may be correct about the sheer linguistic possibility of referring to God in new ways. Someone could just stipulate that she will refer
to the God Christians call "Father, Son, and Holy Spirit" as "Ms. X" or
"The Big Guy in the Sky." But what is linguistically possible is not necessarily legitimate. His unqualified appeal to experiential authorization
seems to overlook the historic distinction between special revelation and
post-canonical religious experience. This move not only places the Godtalk (and therefore the theology) of the Gnostics and Mary Baker Eddy on
the same level as that of Matthew, John, and Paul. By implication it also
legitimates the Heavenly Father and Mother of Joseph Smith and the ontologically masculine-feminine God of Rev. Moon (Unification Church),
alleged experiential revelations of God that likewise trace their referencechains back to the Bible.
Christianity is rich with language for God that has come from philosophical reflection, religious experience, and the religious imagination:
Great Designer, bright burning Tiger, and Hound of Heaven. But this language remains secondary to and defined by the language of the Bible. It is
not the standard coin of Christian worship, piety, and faith. The same
should hold for Mother language derived from natural revelation and religious experience.
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III. Feminine Language for God in Scripture
But Dell'Olio also invokes special revelation. He asserts that "there are
numerous Biblical examples of the use of feminine language to describe
God ... which may then serve as a basis for the use of certain feminine terms
(like 'mother') in connection with God since such terms are consistent with
the feminine language that is used" (p. 195). To test his appeal we must
examine both the number and linguistic status of the Bible's feminine references to God.
There are fewer than two dozen reasonably tenable feminine references
to God in the Bible, all of them figures of speech, many of them implied or
indirect, and most of them in the Old Testament. s Some inclusivists claim
that there are many more instances that have been lost in translation or
suppressed. Many argue that important divine names, such as "EI
Shaddai," and basic personal terms for God, such as "Spirit," are feminine.
When subjected to standard exegesis, however, most of these assertions
simply do not stand Up.9
Dell'Olio provides an instructive example (p. 203), the common claim
that Paul's sermon to the Athenian philosophers contains an image of God
as a pregnant mother: "in him we live and move and have our being" (Acts
17:28). This suggestion might seem plausible until one discovers that the
source of Paul's quote is a hymn to Zeus by Epimenides the CretanlO and
was almost surely neither intended nor heard as a divine womb metaphor.
Many inclusivist claims about feminine language for God in Scripture tum
out like this one.
Nevertheless, there are genuine biblical feminine figures of speech for
God. At issue is whether and how they present God as Mother. Dell'Olio
writes: "if one finds maternal predicates ascribed to a subject, as is the case
in certain Biblical descriptions of God, it would seem that one is within
one's linguistic rights to refer to God as 'Mother'" (p. 197). His hypothesis
may be true, but his conclusion is mistaken because his analysis of the original text and its figurative language is incomplete.
What is overlooked can be illustrated from his own repeated example,
Deuteronomy 32:18: "you forgot the God who gave you birth" (NIV). It is
true, as he claims, that the verb is properly translated "gave you birth" and
therefore maternal in meaning. But that does not give us the right to infer
that God, the subject, is Mother. For the grammatical form of this verb is
masculine, reflecting that its subject is explicitly masculine. "God" is El,
who is Yahweh ("the Lord" in verse 19; cf. "Father" in 6). In Hebrew these
divine names are not only grammatically but also personally masculine.
This is the case with all the divine names and standard personal titles in
the Old and New Testaments. ll
What we have in Deuteronomy 32:18 is actually a case of cross-gender
imagery, a kind of trope in which a feature normally associated with one gender is figuratively predicated of a person of the other gender. 12 Other examples are "Saddam is the mother of all dictators," "Sally is bull-headed," Jesus
as a mother hen (Matt. 23:37), nursing at the breasts of kings (Isa. 60:16
NRSV), and Paul in childbirth (Gal. 4:19). It turns out that all the feminine
references to God in the Hebrew and Greek Bible are cross-gender images. n
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Because they are cross-gender images, the feminine figures of speech in
the Bible no more linguistically warrant "Mother" as a primary name or
title for God and "She" as an appropriate pronoun than feminine imagery
warrants these terms for Saddam, Jesus, or Paul. By Dell'Olio's own criterion, therefore, using "Mother" and "She" as linguistically equivalent to
"Father" and "He" is not "within the linguistic rights" of inclusivists, since
it is not "consistent with the feminine language that is used." However,
biblical usage surely does warrant feminine language for God in a secondary, supplemental, figurative sense.

IV. Names, Figures of Speech, and Language for God
The distinction between names, titles, and appellatives on one hand and
figures of speech on the other deserves further comment. Almost all discussions of gendered language for God fatally confuse two different meanings of "figurative" or "metaphorical" language: the "figurative" or
"metaphorical" nature of human language generally in relation to the transcendence of God; and the distinction within language for God between
the "figurative" or "metaphorical" parts of speech and the non-figurative
parts of speech. What results is a completely fallacious argument from
feminine imagery to feminine names for God.
The first meaning reflects the commonplace that our language cannot
literally describe or define God as it does creatures since he transcends
creaturely categories. Thus language for God is said to be "symbolic,"
"analogical," "metaphorical," "figurative," or something similar, and several theories of how language meaningfully refers to and asserts truth
about God have been devised. Because of divine transcendence, "Father,"
"Lord," "King," and all the other biblical terms for God share this symbolic, analogical, figurative, or metaphorical quality.
It does not follow, however, (and here is the fallacy of equivocation) that
"Yahweh" "God," "Father," "King," and the other primary biblical terms
for God are metaphors or any other figure of speech in the second meaning
of "figurative/metaphorical." Standard linguistic analysis classifies these
terms as proper names, titles, and (non-figurative in this sense) predicate
nouns or appellatives. Dell'Olio perpetuates this confusion by following
Sally McFague's treatment of "Father" and "Mother" both as metaphors
(pp. 196, 200).
Lack of clarity about names, titles, and metaphorical meaning also
clouds his response to Hook and Kimel, who (correctly) classify "Father"
in the New Testament as "a designating title...which functions like a proper name in its unique referentiality." Dell'Olio charges that their appeal to
Kripke's view of a proper name as a rigid designator is confused because
they regard "Father" as bearing metaphorical significance descriptive of
God, whereas Kripke holds that "names are not descriptions" (p. 201).
But Kripke's view of proper names does not rule out their having
descriptive meaning in addition to their essential function as rigid designators and is therefore consistent with Hook and Kimel's analysis of
"Father." Hook and Kimel are working with a standard biblical and theological notion of "name" as a unique personal reference that (typically)
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bears meaning, a definition that does not imply a strong distinction
between a proper name and a title. Consider some examples: "Immanuel"
is a name that means "God with us" (Matt. 1:23). In Isaiah 9:6 the name
(shem) of the coming son of David is "Wonderful Counselor, Mighty God,
Everlasting Father, Prince of Peace." A name (onoma) of Jesus Christ in
Revelation 19:13 is "The Word of God" and in verse 16 his name is "King
of kings and Lord of lords." Technically all of these cases are titles and are
descriptive, but they are regarded as names in Scripture. The same is true
of "Father," universally regarded in the theological tradition as the name
(nomen proprium) of the First Person of the Trinity,14 as well as the most personal title of the one God (1 Cor. 8:6).
Hook and Kimel are correct that there are no feminine names for God of
this sort in Scripture. And we have indicated why there is no linguistic
momentum in the Bible's feminine imagery that would accord "Mother" a
status equal to "Father" as this sort of divine title or name. Adding
"Mother" as a primary term for God to the biblical-traditional reference
chain is therefore an arbitrary act unwarranted by the tradition of Scripture.
Furthermore, even if we could successfully refer to the God of the Bible
by attaching "Mother" to the historical reference-chain, as Dell'Olio asserts,
it cannot have equal status precisely because "Father" is not merely a rigid
designator but the bearer of revelational meaning that "Mother" does not
share. One definitive significance, for example, arises from the messianic
covenant with David (2 Sam. 7:12-16), where God declares himself a father
to David's royal sons forever. This messianic theme develops in the Old
Testament (e.g., Ps. 2:6-7, Isa. 9:6-7) and culminates in God's Father-Son
relationship with Jesus (e.g., Lk. 1:32). This theme is then explicated and
refined into the Triune Name, invoked by Jesus himself and given to the
church for all the world to acknowledge (Matt. 28:19). The feminine
imagery of Scripture lacks this meaning as well as the linguistic function of
personal designation. It simply cannot be equivalent to the Bible's primary
(masculine) language.

V. Orthodoxy and Feminine Language for God
Prof. Dell'Olio questions whether biblical language is necessary for maintaining orthodoxy, responding specifically to the concern that Mother language leads to pantheism. He does not raise the equally important issue of
trinitarian heterodoxy.
I agree that Mother-language does not imply heterodoxy in a conceptually or propositionally necessary way. But the traditionalists' point is not
primarily that the propositional content of Mother-language is unequivocally pantheistic or that it entails heresy. They worry more that its personal
and imaginative associations within the complex dynamics of human spirituality, unrestrained by supernatural revelation, push in the direction of
heresy or false religion. They note a significant correlation in the world
religions between mother goddesses and pantheism, paganism, and contemporary neo-paganism. They know that theologians who promote
inclusive language for God frequently also hold kinds of panentheism that
make God's involvement in the world part of the divine nature or neces-
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sary for its self-realization. ls Furthermore, traditionalists note how frequently those who hold unorthodox doctrines of the Trinity and
Christology (e.g., Gnostics, Shakers, Christian Science, Mormonism, and
Moon's Unification theology) speak of the divine as both masculine and
feminine. Whatever the spiritual-cultural-conceptual dynamics behind
these correlations, opponents of inclusivism worry that the content of the
faith would diminish in truthfulness if feminine language were given full
equality in Scripture, the Creeds, the liturgy, and Christian discourse.
There is a way for users of feminine language to remain Christian in the
biblical-traditional sense: simply to state up front that "Mother" refers to
God as presented in Scripture and historically confessed by the church.
This is the intention of many who use inclusive language. The crucial
point, however, is that this approach implies a "supplementary but secondary" view of feminine language, acknowledging that the (masculine)
language of Scripture and tradition is definitive of the meaning and doctrinal content of the Christian faith.

VI. Idolatry, Sexism, and Biblical Language for God
Dell'Olio agrees with Elizabeth Johnson that using only masculine language for God is both oppressive to women and idolatrous (p. 205).
Traditional Christians must reject this allegation if only because it implies
that the Bible and God himself, its primary author, are sexist and promote
idolatry. A response is not difficult, because he commits the fallacy of confusing use and abuse, throwing out the baby of biblical language with the
bath of idolatry and sexism. I claim that the language of Scripture is
redemptive, not oppressive.
Inclusivists insist that feminine language for God and inclusion of
women are necessarily correlative: they stand or fall together. A better
approach to the problem of sexism in Christian tradition is to reject this
correlation and return to the language of God and justice for humans as
found in Scripture. According to the Old Testament, Elohim created male
and female together in his image. Yahweh the King loves and demands
justice for all, especially the poor and oppressed, widows and orphans.
According to the New Testament, God Almighty promises to be a Father to
his sons and daughters (2 Cor. 6:18). We all have the privileged status of
children and heirs of God through Jesus Christ the Son, in whom there is
neither male nor female (Gal. 3:28). Scripture's language for God is masculine and at the same time the Bible promotes general human equality, justice, and flourishing for men and women alike. (This claim can be defended whether or not Scripture allows the ordination of women, as I think it
does.) Given the pattern of gendered language in Scripture, it is unnecessary and mistaken to make full inclusion of humans dependent upon
inclusive language for God. 16
Inclusivism seems more likely to be guilty of the sin of idolatry than the
biblical-Christian tradition, if it consists in worshipping humanly constructed ideas about God instead of God as he has revealed himself. A better solution to the temptation of idolizing the masculinity of God is to
remind ourselves what the church has always taught: the masculine lan-
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guage for God in Scripture does not mean that God is ontologically masculine. In short, the abuses of biblical-traditional language for God are better
addressed by a return to its proper use than by adopting egalitarian gender-inclusive language for God.

VII. Conclusion
Questions about the nature and content of divine revelation and their relation to human religious practice have philosophical aspects and raise philosophical questions. But they are not primarily philosophical. We Christian
philosophers need the help of ecclesiastically rooted biblical scholars, theologians, linguists, and liturgists to discuss the issues competently.
But even participation of scholars from other disciplines will probably
not settle the debate. For we come from different parts of the Christian tradition and find ourselves at home with more traditional or more modern
expressions of the faith and understandings of its sources and warrants.
Even after thorough interdisciplinary discussion, we may not come to
agreement on the nature and content of Holy Scripture or the status of the
Nicene Creed or the weight of extra-biblical religious experience. And if
we do not agree on these issues, we are unlikely to agree about appropriate
language for God. My motive in responding to Prof. Dell'Olio is to make
clearer some of the hermeneutical and theological issues that are unavoidably connected with inclusive language for God, whatever our personal
conclusions.

Calvin Theological Seminary
NOTES
1. Andrew Dell'Olio, "Why Not God the Mother?" Faith and Philosophy 15
(1998), pp. 193-209. He claims to defend (p. 206 n. 3) Patricia Altenbernd
Johnson's endorsement of gender inclusive language for God in "Feminist
Christian Philosophy?" Faith and Philosophy 9 (1992), pp. 320- 34, and he finds
useful (p. 207 n. 10) George Isham's "Is God Exclusively a Father?" Faith and
Philosophy 13 (April 1996), pp. 266-71. He criticizes the challenges to inclusive
language made by William Harper, "On Calling God 'Mother'," Faith and
Philosophy 11 (1994), pp. 290-97, and Donald Hook and Alvin Kimel, Jr.,
"Calling God 'Father': A Theolinguistic Analysis," Faith and Philosophy 12
(1995), pp. 207-222.
2. I develop this position in Our Father in Heaven: Christian Faith and
Inclusive Language for God (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1998).
3. Alvin Kimel, ed., Speaking the Christian God: The Holy Trinity and the
Challenge of Feminism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992) is the best collection of
contemporary essays defending biblical-traditional language for God. Many of
the authors-Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Methodist, Presbyterian,
Episcopal, Lutheran, Reformed, and of other traditions- affirm a role for feminine language for God consistent with the pattern of Scripture. This position
was occasionally practiced in Christian tradition. Julian of Norwich's several
uses of feminine language for God (mainly for the Son) in her Showings of
Divine Love are well known. Calvin used such language rarely, but did not
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object to it in principle. Commenting on the (possible) maternal metaphor for
God in Isaiah 46:3, he wrote "God ... manifested himself to be both their Father
and their Mother." Commentary on the Book of the Prophet Isaiah, trans. W.
Pringle, 4 vols. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1948), Vol. 3, pp. 436-37.
4. Avoiding gendered language altogether is also commonly recommended as a means of treating both genders equally. Following Dell'Olio, I will not
address that inclusivist strategy.
5. Margo Houts, "Is God Also Our Mother?" Perspectives 12 (June-July
1997), pp. 8-12, distinguishes these positions as "hierarchical inclusivism" and
"egalitarian inclusivism," rejecting the former. Elizabeth Johnson, She Who Is:
The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse (New York: Crossroad,
1992), pp. 47-57, considers and rejects several strategies for using feminine language for God in a secondary way and insists on full equality.
6. See "revelation," The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Churciz, ed. F. L.
Cross and E. A. Livingstone (Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 1392-93; and
"God: Possibility of Knowledge of," Handbook of Catholic Theology, ed. W.
Beinert and F. Schuessler Fiorenza (New York: Crossroad, 1995), pp. 284-85.
7. God's non-sexuality in relation to the meaning of the Father-Son language of the Trinity was defended and articulated, for example, by Hilary of
Poi tiers, De Trinitate, 1, 4, and 18, and by Athanasius, De Synodis, 42. lowe
these references to Roland Frye, "Language for God and Feminist Language,"
Speaking the Christian God, p. 20.
God's genderlessness is nowhere asserted in Scripture, although it does say
that he does not have the form of man or woman (e.g., Deut. 4:15-16). This
doctrine is inferred from such statements in Scripture, from the fact that God
made both male and female in his image, and from the philosophical observation that gender is a correlative property incompatible with the simplicity and
perfection of the divine nature.
8. See Cooper, "The Bible's Feminine and Maternal References to God,"
chapter three of Our Father in Heaven.
9. Some inclusivists state as fact that El Shaddai means "Breasted God."
This idea has been most fully defended by David Biale, "The God with Breasts:
El Shaddai in the Bible," History of Religions 20/3 (February 1982), pp. 240-56.
Biale openly admits that his case is almost entirely hypothetical. It is based on
tenuous etymology, that the epithet-name "Shaddai" comes from the word for
"breast," and speculative historiography, that the priestly redactors assimilated
Shaddai, a hypothetical ancient mother god, into El in order to incorporate
popular Israelite Asherah worship into Yahwism. This imaginative construction is vastly less likely than the reasons for the Septuagint tradition's translation of El Shaddai as "God Almighty."
Some inclusivists claim that, since "spirit" (ruach) is usually grammatically
feminine in Hebrew, Old Testament references to God's Spirit carry personal
femiillne nuances. But this is false because the Old Testament attributes "spirit" to God the same ways it does to humans ("the spirit of the Lord" and "the
spirit of Moses"), and in the case of humans its grammatical gender does not
reflect personal gender. "The spirit of Moses" does not connote Moses' feminine side. The point is moot in the Septuagint and New Testament because the
Greek term pneuma is neuter. (The relation between grammatical and personal
gender in the biblical languages is somewhat different than in German, to
which Dell'Olio appeals on p. 201.)
10. See for example, F. F. Bruce, The Book of Acts (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1977), pp. 359- 60. Paul's other quote, "for we are his offspring," is from a
poem about Zeus by Aratus.
11. See Cooper, "The Bible's Masculine Language for God," chapter four in
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Our Father in Heaven. El is the patriarchal high God in ancient near eastern religion, also referred to as Elohirn in the Old Testament. Yahweh, the special
name revealed to Moses, is probably the third masculine singular form of T
AM, that is, "He Is." See Barry Bandstra, Reading the Old Testament: An
Introduction to the Hebrew Bible (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1995), p. 120.
Elizabeth Johnson, She Who 15, pp. 241-45, completely overlooks the Hebrew
etymology when attempting to argue that Yahweh should be understood as
"She Who Is." However, the masculinity of God in the biblical text does not
imply that God is ontologically masculine.
12. See Al Wolters, "Cross-Gender Imagery in the Bible," Bulletin for Biblical
Research 8 (1998), pp. 217-28.
13. See Cooper, "Cross Gender Imagery for God" in Our Father in Heaven,
chapter five. Some, as in Deuteronomy 32:18, Job 38:29, and Psalm 90:2, are
birth metaphors. Others, such as Isaiah 42:14, 49:15, and 66:13, are similes in
which God (Elohim or Yahweh) is said to be like a mother in some way. In all
cases of feminine imagery, the subject name or title for God in the original language is grammatically and personally masculine.
14. See, for example, Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica T. 33. 2: "the proper name [nomen propriumJ of a person signifies that whereby the person is distinguished from all other persons ... Hence this name Father, whereby paternity
is signified, is the proper name of the person of the Father."
15. John Cobb and David Griffin, Process Theology: An Introductory
Exposition (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1976), pp. 9-10 and 61-62, emphasize
that their dipolar theology cuts against the traditional view of God as "exclusively male" in favor of a balanced masculine-feminine view. The panentheistic theologies of Sally McFague and Rosemary Ruether also come to mind. See
McFague, "God and the World," in Models of God: Theology for an Ecological,
Nuclear Age (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), pp. 59-90, where she follows process
theology in viewing the world as "God's body." And see Ruether, Sexism and
God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon, 1983), pp. 48-49 and 8692, where she designates Godl ess as "Primal Matrix" [matrix from mater, Latin
for "mother").
16. It is surely legitimate to wonder why God revealed himself in exclusively masculine language. Defenders of biblical language sometimes hypothesize that this language is essential to a proper understanding of the Creatorcreature relation or of the Trinity, or perhaps that it is God's best strategy for
communicating in a sinful patriarchal world. But these are only pious guesses.
In the end Christians accept this language because it is God's self-naming, not
because we understand and approve of God's reasons for it. Surely there is no
injustice to humans in how God has revealed himself, and there is no incompatibility between the divine names and justice among humans.

